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Topic selection and goals 
 
 The major motivating factor for selecting our topic was the development of the 
situation of Kosovo and its effect on Hungary. When we decided to research Kosovo it was 
not yet clear what the duration and solution of the crises will be and what consequences it will 
have. Although by today the international legal status of Kosovo has been resolved but at the 
same time its consequences are just starting to evolve. These consequences affect both the 
future of Serbia, the possibilities of the Serb Hungarians (Voivodina), but the stability of the 
whole Western Balkan (and so the expansion of the European Union, the common foreign and 
security policy matters, its operational possibilities, minority protections systems, etc.) and 
indirectly the whole post cold war international legal system as well (UN, NATO, 
international autonomy vs. integrity of borders, creating precedence or not). 
 
 For Serbia, the fundamental dilemma of the resolution of Kosovo is whether it can join 
such international organizations which actively take part in the “mutilation” of the state. The 
question is which direction shall the Kosovo events lure the Serb State into; will Brussels or 
Moscow be point of orientation in the future? As a result of the prevailing Serbian internal 
political situation and the international power relations from time to time the probability of 
one or the other shall change. The shrinking of state territory and the size of population may 
be further sources of problems in Serbia, namely its relative weight and prestige will decrease 
in the region, due to social frustration the tolerance towards minorities (Hungarians, Bosnians, 
Albanian, Slovaks, etc.) left back in its territory will decrease. At the same time with Kosovo 
the number of Serbian refugees in the remaining state territory and over the borders had 
increased, of whom the state has to take care of. 
 
 For the Serbian Hungarians the big question is that what possibilities will the new 
situation bring for their intentions of autonomy. Will the independence of Kosovo make their 
possibilities better or worse? We believe that Hungary on the decision making level had still 
not realized that in our direct neighborhood, in Serbia and Kosovo such status problems, like 
Voivodina, Sandzhak, Prsevo, Mitrovica are to be solved, which determine the stability of the 
region and the Hungarian-Serbian relation, and may even dramatically affect the future of the 
Hungarians in Voivodina. 
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 Most expect the solution to be found by the EU; at the same time the organization has 
not been able to prove its full capability to solve the problem. Furthermore, in many older 
member states of the European Union people do not understand, do not “sense” this region. 
What is even more important: unfortunately they are not acquainted with the matters of 
minority. For this, it would be important to get an initiative role to solve the status issues and 
other issues as well (which are not only applicable to Serbia and Kosovo, but the entire 
Western Balkan region), since perhaps our security is affected the most by the situation in this 
region. 
 
 The European Union does not have a minority protection system; the minority 
protection is not part of the acquis communautaire. There is no indication of “national 
minority” in any official, legally binding document. There are directives prohibiting 
discrimination, but this is not sufficient. The Union does not have a functioning minority 
protection system and it does not have standards and norms. Until admission, the Union has 
some controlling role which is manifested mainly in the annual reports. 
 
 We believe that in the present situation Hungary may play such an important 
mediating role in the relation of South Eastern Europe and the Balkans as did Austria with 
respect to Central Europe. Naturally we should get prepared for this role in every respect and 
we should communicate our readiness. Perhaps with our research we may add a little to this 
activity. 
 
 The problem of Kosovo in the beginning of the 21st Century has proven again the 
international law and diplomacy is the pawn of the world power interests. Beside 
independence, at least as many arguments looking objective can be brought for it against it. 
The occurrence of one or the other solutions, before all, was the result of the world power 
games. For a bystander, the solution of the Serbian-Albanian conflict may seem to be a real 
ethnic tension and an American-Russian-European competition at the same time. One thing 
that is sure is that no matter how hard we emphasize the opposite, Kosovo indeed creates 
precedence. It establishes the possibility of the declaration of a one-sided independence with 
world-power support. A presumable impressive geopolitical event of Europe after the Second 
World War is the declaration and recognition of the independent Kosovo but we do not realize 
its all-embracing consequences.   
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 For us Hungarians, since we are neighboring the region and thus are indirectly affected 
by the conflict, it is necessary to know, reveal and manage the problems as well as possible. 
Merely for the good-neighbour relation it is necessary for Hungary to understand the 
problems of Serbia, but at the same time the situation of Kosovo becoming sovereign and the 
situation of Kosovo Serbs may even create a favorable situation for the trans-border 
Hungarians. 
 
- The initial goal of our work is to analyze the genesis and evolution of the Kosovo 
issue with the intention to draw an objective picture of the nature, actors, and 
alternatives of the conflict and of the course of the geographical evolution of the 
region until the establishment of the sovereign Kosovo. 
- The second goal is to – although it seems that the international community has decided 
to recognize the independence – review and analyze the not always trouble free array 
of events leading to attaining independence. 
- Our third goal is to determine what potential challenges the new sovereign state will 
have to face in the near future. 
 
 
Applied methods 
 
 In the course of the research reviewing the previous literature was apparent. This 
forms the basis of our research which is made complete by the primer source-processing of 
the reports and analysis of different international civilian and military organizations operating 
in Kosovo. Among the primer sources the archive-researches must be mentioned, in our case 
meaning that the examination of such original maps has contributed to the detailed cognition 
of the historical development of the region. 
 
 Since there has not been official census in the region since 1981 the data at our 
disposal is relatively deficient and questionable. In spite of this, we try to underline our 
arguments and conclusions beside the highest possible control also by analyzing statistical 
data. Principally, the census of 1981 as considered being the last Yugoslavian census with 
respect to Kosovo, and the census of 1991 as the last Yugoslavian census, which however, 
due to the boycott of Kosovo Albanians includes only estimates of the province and the 
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estimates of the international organizations (first of all the OESC and UN) and the Kosovo 
Statistic Office represent the sources to be processed.  
 
 The historical and political geographical processes chosen for the subject of the 
analysis happen in front of us nowadays and substantially exceed the “stimulus-threshold” of 
international political journalism, thus – as a result – we often refer to the daily domestic and 
international reports as well.  
 
 Finally, the last group of our methods constitutes of the field research indispensable 
for geographical surveys, which contribute to a better understanding of the place and 
circumstances, to the verification of our statements made in our theory and to the control of 
the validity of the context.  
 
Delimitation of the area 
 
 With respect to the Kosovo conflict naturally we first deal with Kosovo, Europe’s 
youngest state, the former autonom Yugoslavian province. The examination of the area 
surrounded by the present political borders could be evident, but at the same time the 
historical frames, the living territories of Albanians comprising the majority population of 
Kosovo and the decades spent in different political entities (Ottoman Empire, Yugoslavia, 
Great-Albania, Serbia) make the choice and use of a wider research region necessary.  
 
 Kosovo and the Kosovo conflict forms an integral part of the sometimes more violent, 
sometimes milder Balkan conflicts having begun in the 19th Century, so the smallest area of 
our topic has to be the Balkan Peninsula. With respect to our topic the largest European 
peninsula expanding into the Mediterranean Sea has several unique features. 
 
 One of the greatest adventures of the region is the sea, the distance from the sea and 
the relation to the sea. This feature affects certain Balkan regions differently. The sea means 
and had always meant the easiest and simplest way of communication with the outside world, 
which in certain cases meant the accessibility of the European central region, the possibilities 
of modernization, innovation, in other words development. For the costal territories this 
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represented advantage in economical and social development, at the same time was attendant 
with cosmopolitanism and the coercion of external powers.  
 
 These opportunities for modernization were limited for those regions lying absolute or 
relatively far from the sea. Although there are several overland routes in the Peninsula, the 
volume and - by this - the effect of the flow of information and goods fall far behind the 
effects of that transmitted by the sea. Furthermore, due to the natural geographical aptitudes, 
these land communication channels are strongly determined in most periods of history.  
 
 The mountains represent the other important natural aptitude. The peninsula has the 
highest average altitude in Europe, at the same time it does not exceed 3000 meters anywhere. 
The multitudinous, stiff climbing humps which are rarely intermitted by river-dales and basins 
suitable for settlement and transport are the most characteristical aptitudes of the peninsula. 
The relief meant at the same time the limitation of communication and transport, the 
determination of settled living’s spatial expansion and influencing spatial structures’ 
formation which are characteristics for the Balkans. Besides limiting transport and settlement, 
the highlands provided security and protection against the occasionally appearing conquerors, 
thus the highlander semi-nomad pastoral-societies (which existed until the 19th Century) were 
able to preserve their identity, national, linguistic and cultural detachedness.  
 
 The fact that a unified empire, world power from the Balkan center could not evolve, 
can be accounted to the extremely intended relief. The extremely intended surface favoured 
the establishment of separate power centers, which was heightened  by the fact that the 
peninsula’s mountains are the most multitudinous and highest in the central regions, the rivers 
flow from here in radial direction outwards, which oriented the settled nations and the states 
founded by them from the centers to the peripheries. (T. Mendöl 1948). 
 
 This central territory is right near the Kosovo region, where - due to the mentioned 
natural geographical reasons - the interests of certain Balkan ethnic groups collide, and ethnic 
contact zones, regions of contentious affiliation, delayed in becoming a nation, ethnic groups 
of questioned status evolve. A form of manifestation for example of this is the Macedonian 
issue, or nowadays Albanian issue in which one of the problems is Kosovo.  
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 A smaller slice within our Balkan Peninsula category is the newly evolving political 
geographical category, the West Balkan evolving in the 90’s, in the territory of the disbanding 
Yugoslavia. The West Balkan, as a territory-category, is used by the EU bureaucrats and 
diplomats, so separating the remaining part of the peninsula getting the adjectives of a 
problematic, instable area on the remaining South Slavic Stage, posing security risk. The 
former Yugoslavia without Slovenia and Albania belong to this circle. Opposite is the East 
Balkan as a category. Its members (Romania and Bulgaria) face serious economical and social 
problems but do not represent security and military tension sources (N. Pap – P. Reményi  
2007).  
 
 The West Balkan is primarily a political category and with the regional progression of 
the Euro-Atlantic integration we can gradually count with its loss of importance. At the same 
time, the political and military processes of the years of the 1990s and the 2000s are closely 
connected to this artificial political category. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Illustration: The countries of the West Balkan: G. Kovács 
 The former autonom Kosovo province, Europe’s youngest state lays in the internal 
highland area of the Balkan Peninsula. Its territory is 10,887 square kilometers, and with what 
it belongs to the small-area states. In geological perspective it lays on a stirring area, on the 
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borders of the Dinarics and the Trak-Macedon masszif, the majority of its territory consists of 
the ofiolit belt and the Vardar-zone. That leads to the relatively large basins (Kosovo Polje, 
Metohija), which are separated by 500-1000 meter high central-chain mountain-like areas. 
Further consequence of the geological structure is its richness in minerals (metals, coal) which 
has been utilized by the population since ancient times.  
 
 
2. Illustration: Koszovo 
Source: Perry Castaneda http//www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/Kosovo.html 
Downloaded: 03.08.2009 
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Results 
 
•  A from time to time appearing and reproducing peculiarity of Kosovo in the empire 
transforming space of the Balkan is the frontier characteristic.  
 
 As a result of our research we could state that from the beginning until today the 
frontier character of the examined region is a regularly recurring feature in the history of 
Kosovo. This character is a multi-dimensional feature, since it is to be understood not only in 
an ethnic sense, but also as an empiric or state frontier character. Looking at the history of 
Kosovo from the age of antiquities until today, the frontier character can be seen as a 
regularly recurring element, of which an important dimension is its ethnic character. This 
feature can be observed from the beginning from ancient times, since the region fell in the illir 
and trak collision area, contact zone. The population of the region, the dardans forming a 
mixed population - who by the majority of the scientists are considered to be the ethnic basic 
component of Albanians - retreated back into the mountains in the 7th Century as less 
romanised Illir-Trak konglomerate fleeing from the Slavs arriving in large numbers. 
Historically measured, the Albanian infiltration into the Slavic-turning region began within a 
short time and speeded up from the end of the 17th Century. This resulted in the strengthening 
of the previously existing frontier character. The Slavic-Albanian relation is different from the 
former Illir and Trak relation. Beside the fact that – although on a smaller scale – one can 
observe the assimilation affecting each other, basically we can see the expansion of nations 
having different cultures and languages to the detriment of each other. As a certain waving 
motion, depending on the balance of power, the region's dominant element is either Slavic or 
Albanian. Presently, the Albanian immigration and the large number of natural reproduction, 
the expansion of Albanian habitation and the Serb transmigration is endangering the eroding 
and subsistence of the ethnic contact zone existing from the beginning of the 21st Century 
until today. 
 
 Another dimension of the frontier character is the periodically appearing empirical or 
state frontier feature. At the end of the 11th Century Kosovo had become a frontier territory of 
Byzantium with the expansion of Raška and by the beginning of the 13th Century it had 
integrated into the Serb state. At the same time, the frontier character existed until the first 
half of the 14th Century, but this time as part of Raška with relation to the Byzant Empire. 
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During the expansion of the Turks from the second half of the 14th Century Kosovo again had 
become a frontier territory. This status remained until the mid 15th Century, 1455, when for a 
longer period the Ottoman Empire fitted it into its own – several times changing – structure. 
 
• The situation of the Kosovo Serb minority and its solution has great impact on 
the relation of the Hungarians in Voivodina. First, the declension of the Kosovo 
Serbs’ situation may inspire the Serbs migrated to Voivodina to take revenge on 
Hungarians and second, in case of a malevolent outcome the exodus of the Serbs 
shall not avoid Voivodina. Third, it is due to the precedence feature of the 
settlement, which could even be considered as a positive development, 
 
the number of incidents against nationalities living in Voivodina had increased since March 
2004. Merely the Hungarian organizations of Voivodina have registered nearly 300 anti-
Hungarian atrocities – and this number is increased by attacks against other nationalities – 
between March and September 2004 in the North Serbian province. The seriousness of the 
situation is well represented by the fact that previously so many anti-Hungarian atrocities 
have not been registered in even a decade in Voivodina. 
 
 As we know, in the 90s the fragile ethnic balance of Voivodina – created after the 
relocation of Germans in Tito’s times - broke up. Following the South Slavic wars more that 
300 thousand Serbs (S. Kicosev – K. Kocsis 1998) refugees arrived to the province, mainly 
from Croatia and Bosnia (according to certain estimates their number is at least 500 
thousand), then in 1999 a part of the Serbs who had fled from Kosovo settled down in 
Voivodina.  
 
 The former peaceful coexistence of the people living in Voivodina was for the new 
Serb settlers unknown, as also the economical and cultural independence of the autonom 
province. Among the perpetrators the number of Serbs who had “immigrated” in the 90s was 
strikingly high. The Serb refugees took revenge on the minorities living in Voivodina for the 
indignity they had to suffer from the majority ethnic group in their homeland. For them 
Voivodina was no different from other territories of the Balkans, Bosnia or Kosovo. The Serb 
refugees who had arrived in the 90s are still citizens of the province living in the worst 
circumstance. The majority of them are unemployed, their living is totally insecure and the 
local authorities keep threatening to tear down their houses they had built without licenses.   
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 The bitterness of the pursued Serbs and their anger spring into violence and the 
minorities living in the territory of Voivodina always provide a perfect target for these 
emotions. This had happened in March 2004 when - due to the outcry caused by the atrocities 
against and the massacres in Kosovo – the Voivodina Serb demonstrators had started to break 
and crash everything in the areas inhabited by Hungarians and other nationalities and had 
attacked institutions of minorities as well. Most experts did not pay attention to the fact that 
the number of violent events in Voivodina usually increased when atrocities happened against 
Serbs living there. In other words, when the atmosphere turns hot due to the events in Kosovo 
the ethnic violence increases in Voivodina. 
 
 Furthermore, a big issue is what kind of solution can be found for the protection of the 
Kosovo Serbs who are now in minority. As we have unfolded this in our thesis, the Serbs of 
the Mitrovica region are not willing to voluntarily subject themselves to Kosovo Albanian 
power. The homeland provides substantial support for this and the international organizations 
represented in the region are not able to abolish this situation. So some kind of compromise 
must be found since the modification of the frontiers is unacceptable for the majority 
(Albanians, international organizations, third countries). 
 
 Organizations (NATO, OSCE, EU, UN) and states having a significant role in 
achieving peace and independence of Kosovo at the same time consequently call for the 
protection of minority rights, thus – after a slow consolidation – some kind of a minority 
protection system will have to be established. If this contains broader and more insured rights 
than the present situation of Voivodina then this can be used as a reference base for improving 
the situation of the Hungarian minority as well. 
 
• The maximal support for the democratic Serbia in achieving its integration 
efforts is an eminent interest of the Hungarian diplomacy. This arises on the one 
hand from the neighbouring-policy, on the other hand from the responsibility for 
the Hungarian minority in Voivodina. 
 
 The Serb side has been facing a series of frustration beginning from the early 90s. By 
this we mean that by losing the leading position of a state-alliance having a military extremely 
strong, politically relatively significant influence, nowadays “de facto” losing one of their 
autonom provinces as well, they have turned out to be the inhabitants of a much smaller 
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country of the Balkans. At the same time they had to experience that European leading 
powers (Great-Britain, France), who used to support the Serbian efforts, turned away from 
them. In addition, such new or “old-new” participants had appeared (USA, Germany) more 
dynamically in the political arena of South East Europe which had supported ideas, streams 
against the mentioned endeavors. As a result one could fear – and the danger still exists today 
– that Serbia, going against the European integration, might orient towards Russia, 
representing - as a result of the probable rejuvenation of Russia – a significant security policy 
concern as well. 
 
 The present Serb-Hungarian border is the South Eastern border of the military, 
economical and political block embracing Hungary. It is an elemental interest of the 
Hungarian side – putting aside and abstracting from the historical offenses – to have the 
present situation change and thus Serbia become a part of the same blocks, systems as 
Hungary. Belonging to the same block assumes that the major principles of Hungary and 
Serbia will be more or less similar (including the minority-policy as well) and in case of a 
Union membership, as neighbouring, smaller European countries, it will be our common 
interest to cooperate with each other and with other states in similar positions. This can 
strenghen the European position of each participant in Europe and, based on regular 
negotiations and personal contacts established via negotiations, may facilitate the solving of 
the already existing or just emerging problems between each other. The European integration 
of Serbia will entail the etherealizing of borders, our Southern Schengen border will seize to 
exist, which obviously will make contact with the homeland for minorities – although in 
Serbia in larger numbers – on both sides easier.  
 
 Overall, the shock caused by the loss of territory and power may somewhat ease with 
the integration of Serbia and with putting her on a prosperous path.  Hungary may play an 
important role in this, because we know this region well and as a state we have accumulated a 
great capital of knowledge regarding integration issues. For Hungary, the dissolution of 
Serbia’s isolation and her reattachment to the European circulation would be important to 
improve the bilateral economical-political relations and the situation of the Hungarian 
minority, as well as for security policy dimensions. 
 
 One of the greatest challenges for Kosovo is to handle the demographic situation. 
Until the province was under Serb rulership, the so called demographic weapon served the 
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Albanian interests. The natural reproduction well exceeding the Serbian one was the token for 
the success of the Albanian issue on the long term. At the same time, this generates a rapidly 
growing population of a remarkably young age structure, for whom the economy and state 
sectors cannot provide enough employment-possibilities.  
 
 The demographic tension source consists of two larger elements. One is the rapidly 
growing population and the other is the ethnic tensions having caused an internal, hard to 
permeate boundary. Both problems are serious and difficult to handle. The latter threatens to 
split the state but at least projects the picture of a decentralized division similar to Bosnia-
Herczegovina which, upon this example does not imply the formation of an effective state. 
The ethnic-based conflict will poison the relationship between Kosovo communities and will 
probably make international presence necessary for a long time. 
 
 We wish to point out also a very important aspect of the demographic processes. A big 
challenge for the European Union with a continuously ageing society in connection with 
maintaining and increasing the economical level is to supply for a population capable of 
playing an active role in production. A considerable part of this population originates from the 
continents of Africa and Asia. Consequently, a significant segment of the inflowing labor-
force bears cultural and religious traditions different from the European one, resulting in a low 
level of assimilation and alignment to the written and unwritten rules of the majority of the 
society of migrants, and their descendants. We think that a good solution would be to make 
greater efforts to have this population from migration originating from European areas 
producing demographic surplus. Among others, the territory inhabited by Kosovo Albanians 
belongs to this area. We think that in spite the long Ottoman power and Asian influence, their 
culture is part of the universal European culture. And that is why facilitating their inflow is on 
the long term in the vital interest of the more developed part of Europe because the emergence 
and the escalation of tension between the autochthonous society and the Albanian migrant 
communities with partially archaic cultural signs has probably less chances on the long term 
as between arrivals from other continents and locals.  
 
 The realization of this mentioned process would contribute to the deduction of the 
demographic surplus and to the decreasment of local tension. Naturally, we believe that 
establishing a viable Kosovo meeting European critierias is necessary beside forcing back 
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Albanian organized crime encompassing Europe, which would obviously allow the 
elimination of the visa liability of Kosovo citizens.  
 
 The mentioned economical development is inevitable since if it does not keep up with 
the large population growth then the result of the process may be a gradually criminalizing 
society in which radical social and political formations could win more space. For the Kosovo 
Albanians independence was the most important within their individual and common aims, 
reaching it would be practically fulfilling their dreams. At the same time, the Kosovo elite has 
very little experience in governing a sovereign state and in solving everyday problems and 
tensions. Should they not be able to generate growth within the economy of Kosovo and thus 
increase employment in a short time (even with aid or credit), then radicalization will be 
inevitable. Together with similar Macedonian, Albanian and perhaps Serbian and 
Montenegrin processes this may “open new perspectives” in the history of the Balkan 
conflicts. 
 
• A characteristic of the regional political geographical situation of Kosovo is that 
it has a sensitive relation with all neighbours. 
 
Montenegro 
 The best word for characterizing the relationship between the two youngest states of 
Europe is pragmatic. Although differently, but still, both became independent from the 
remaining Yugoslavia among the last ones. Their newly won independence bear identical 
interests in many aspects so the conditions for their cooperation are principally given. This is 
deteriorated by the fact that the relation of Montenegro to Serbia and the Serbian people is 
considerably different than that of the Kosovo Albanians. If we consider the Serb-Albanian 
relation to be the most neuralgic within the second Yugoslav state then we can consider the 
Serb-Montenegrin to be the most balanced. Interestingly, the relation of the two young states 
is determined by their individual relation with a third state. 
 
 Their common state borders are composed of high-mountain chains, so it is a close, 
difficult- to-cross border. Only two roads cross it meeting in the city of Pe. A significant 
number of Albanians live on the Montenegrin side of the border yet this has not caused 
serious ethnic conflicts. Moreover, the Albanian population – naturally not against its own 
interests – was a consequent supporter of the Montenegrin independence. If Montenegro 
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would have not enjoyed their support, the initiative would probably have failed on the 
referendum.  
 
Albania 
 The Kosovo-Albanian relation and the connection of the two states is determined by 
the fact that the majority population of both is Albanian. Either the two states remain to exist 
or not, it is sure that the Kosovo-Albanian relations will commence in an exceptional 
development. We must see that based on political geographical logic the development of the 
relationship with Albania and the necessary infrastructure is an essential interest of Kosovo. 
This results in a change of orientation in Kosovo, the former compulsory Northern (Yugoslav) 
alignment is taken over by a Western (Albanian).  
 
 A neuralgic point of Kosovo’s and Albania’s relationship is the issue of union. 
Disregarding now the international consequences (see later) let us examine what effects it 
would have on the two concerned states. First of all, where would the new center/capital of 
the new state be? Which elite would be the leading group of the new state? The answers are 
not clear since Albania has older state traditions but Kosovo – in spite of the destructions of 
the last decades – has a more developed economy and infrastructure. The qualification, 
experience and property situation of the Albanian and Kosovo population favors the latter 
again. The reason of this is in the possibility of an easier border-crossing since as a 
Yugoslavian citizen the Kosovo Albanians could work in the West, could study in the 
Yugoslavian education system while during this time their Albanian compatriots were the 
citizens of a closed Stalinist system. 
 
 Other sensitive questions will need to be answered if the union will not be formed 
even on the long term. Which state will represent the Albanians in the international arena and 
why that one? Serious arguments can be expected again among the elite of the political, 
economical, scientific fields governing the two states, that can easily force them into a 
dubious competition (who is more Albanian?) for winning the title of the defender of the 
Albanians living in a third country (Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro). 
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Macedonia 
 The most important and most critical indicator of the “barometer” of the Kosovo-
Macedon relation is the Albanian nationality living in the territory of the Republic of 
Macedonia and their actual and expectable behavior and endeavors.  
 
 The first census of the independent Macedonia established in 1991 was held in the 
year of becoming independent but in 1994 the authorities had to repeat it since the Albanian 
population rejected to accept its results. According to the repeated census the population of 
the country in 1994 was overall 1,945 million, of which 1,295 million declared themselves to 
be Macedonian and 441 thousand to be Albanian nationals. By the last census in 2002 the 
population has increased to 2,02 million. From this the number of Macedonians – interesting 
us the most – remained at the same level, 1,297 million (66,6 percent) while the Albanian 
nationals show an intensive increase, raising to 509 thousand (25,17 percent). 
 
 The Albanian-Albanian relationship with Kosovo and Albania is facilitated by the fact 
that the majority counties of the Macedon-Albanians are in the North, North West part of the 
state adjacent to Kosovo and Albania. According to this the Albanians’ area of habitation can 
be considered to be the continuation of the Kosovo and Albanian area causing the internal 
Albanian-Macedonian dividedness and conflict – similar to the Kosovo Serb-Albanian 
dividedness, although different in its proportion – to be present beside the external Albanian 
relations.  
 
 Hence, the result of the early migration from Kosovo to Macedonia and that in the late 
20th Century and early 21st Century manifests in family and partially interwoven, economical 
relations that practically cause the etherealizing of the borders within the Albanian collective 
conscience combined with some kind of a conscience of togetherness and ethnic perpetuity. It 
is no coincidence that beginning from 1999 the supreme Macedonian leadership supported 
Serbia for a long time and totally rejected the independence of Kosovo, fearing that this 
would serve as a precedence that would overthrow the peaceful internal Macedonian relations. 
They thought that with the Albanian aspirations – for the first time since the Second World 
War – the creation of Great-Albania may again come to an attainable proximity.  
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3. Illustration The ratio of ethnic Albanians in the opina-s of  Macedonia based on the 
census of 2002. Source: A. Végh (2006) 
 
 The Macedonian-Albanian conflict of 2001, which many think was an operation 
directed from Kosovo, further oppressed the Macedonian-Kosovo relations. This conflict was 
settled through external pressure by the so called Obrid Agreement which forms the basis for 
coexistence even today. The source of the long term, so called strategic tension stems far 
deeper. The continuous demographic expansion of the Albanian population in a country with 
such a small population can be catastrophic on the short term as well. We have to look for the 
major irreconcilable conflict in the tension between the increasing Albanian and decreasing 
Macedonian population. 
 
 Beside the expectable short and mid-term strengthening of relations, taking the 
tendencies experienced so far into consideration, on the long term we have to count with an 
increasing number of ethnic Albanians and their stronger political activities in the region. It is 
a question, when this growth disturbs the sensitive Macedonian balance layed down in the 
Agreement, and what answers does the Macedonian population and leadership of Macedonia 
have for the expansion of the Albanian living sphere.  Simplifying it, there can be two 
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answers. According to the first, the Macedonian population of Macedonia will not resist the 
Albanian territorial conquest and practically by having the Albanians reach majority, 
Macedonia will become a state with Albanian leadership and majority. The only other 
possibility is resistance individually or in an alliance, that has the danger of a civil war or the 
possibility of changing the borders. 
 
• On the short and mid-term the independence of Kosovo assumes the 
simultaneous existence of two Albanian states which holds the possibility of the 
creation of Great Albania 
 
 During the negotiations, the creation of Great Albania on the short term had no and 
practically has no realistic chances. At the same time, it was no coincidence that this option 
came to the minds of the observers: Kosovo’s accessing to Albania after achieving 
independence, thus establishing Great Albania and correcting the mistakes made when 
establishing the Albanian state in 1913. This possibility does not even have supporters among 
the Albanians today, and the international community and the Serbs are totally against it. At 
the same time, on the long term we cannot imagine anything else than the union of Albanian 
territories. The same nationality living in several states is mainly temporary, created and kept 
up by external powers (German Federal Republic, German Democratic Republic, North and 
South Korea) With the disappearance and weakening of the external powers the two states 
usually unite. We expect the same to happen on the long term in the case of the Albanians as 
well. All this, complemented with the dynamic increase of population might make them the 
largest Balkan nation within decades. Until then the economical, ethnographical, idiomatical, 
identity differences and the disparity of the political and economic elite leading the two 
communities of the Kosovo and Albanian Albanians are even more significant.  
 
• Kosovo’s economy at present is maintained by international aids but the 
resources necessary for self-sufficient development are given. The condition for 
utilizing these resources depends on the elucidation of the international legal 
status, the reduction of security risks and the drastic augmentation of the 
operational effectiveness of the state. 
 
 The situation of the economy is in second-third place of the Kosovo problem-group 
following the issues of statehood and ethnic matters. The state practically has favorable 
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natural resources to develop the economy (metal, coal, hydropower, soil) but the utilization 
currently is very unefficient. 
 
 Nowadays the economy shows both a post-socialist and post-war picture (E. Vadas 
2007). Privatization, the reorganization of state companies have just begun, still the small and 
mid ventures have been operating for a relatively long time in Kosovo, the latest modest 
economical increase is their merit. In spite of this, the GDP per person merely reaches 1,100 
Euro, unemployment is still near 47 percent, poverty is outstanding. Furthermore, the 
economy of the country largely depends on the international aids as well (mainly US and EU), 
which from year to year show a decreasing tendency. Opposite to this, the remittances of 
Kosovo citizens working abroad represent the same volume in the budget, but compared to 
the aids the amount of remittance is annually showing an increasing tendency. The big 
question is what effect the economical crises shattering the developed world will have on the 
aids and on the remittances of those working abroad. If, like the direct investments, these 
show dramatic decrease as well, then the Kosovo government will very soon have to cope 
with a really severe crises. 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
GDP (EUR, Million) 2271 2207 2273 2378 
GDP/person (EUR) 1156 1105 1118 1150 
GDP increase (%) 2,0 -1,0 3,1 3,5 
Remittances of employees abroad (EUR, Million) 219 273 352 398 
Inflation (%) -1,4 -1,4 1,5 2,0 
Budget balance (in GDP percentage) -6,1 -3,2 3,6 6,5 
NET FDI (EUR, Million) 20 59 222 n.d 
Export (EUR,, Million) 79 71 111 147 
Import (EUR, Million) 1023 1093 1306 1576 
Foreign aid (in GDP percentage) 14,8 16,6 14,6 14,2 
Balance of payment (in GDP percentage) -32,7 -34,8 -34,6 -38,2 
Unemployment (%) 39,7 41,4 n.d. n.d. 
 
Table 1: Selected economic indexes of Kosovo Source: E. Vadas 2007. 
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 The greatest assistant for reforming the economy and making it more effective could 
be the increasing foreign investments. Both privatization and greenfield investments could 
significantly improve the status of the economy. But for this there is no realistic chance until 
the legal system of the new state becomes solid, corruption infiltrating every field does not 
decrease and the legal and business environment does not improve considerably. Another 
problem curbing privatization is the dispute on splitting up property which is concomitant to 
the process of becoming independent.  
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Summary of the results 
 
 
 
 A from time to time appearing and reproducing peculiarity of Kosovo in the empire-
transforming space of the Balkan is the frontier characteristic. 
 
 The independence of Kosovo assumes on the short and middle term the co-existence 
of the two Albanian states, which make the formation of a Great-Albania on the long term 
probable. 
 
 The situation of the Kosovo Serb minority and its settling has a great effect on the 
relations of the Voivodina Hungarians. First, because of the precedent-characteristic of the 
settling, second the depraviation of the situation of the Kosovo Serbs could encourage the 
Serbs who have migrated to the Voivodina area to take revenge on the Hungarians. Third, in 
the case of an outcome not favourable for the Serbs the exodus of the Serbs will not avoid the 
Voivodina area. 
 
 It is the eminent interest of the Hungarian diplomacy to give maximal support to the 
democratic Serbia to reach their integration goals. This arises on the one hand from the 
neighbour-politics, on the other hand from the responsibility towards the Hungarians living in 
the Voivodina area.  
 
The economy of Kosovo is sustained currently by international aids, the necessary 
sources for an independent development are given, but the conditions for its exploitation are 
the clarification of the international legal situation, reducing security risks, and the dinamic 
growth of the effectivity of the functioning of the state. 
 23 
The possibilities of utilizing the results and 
further possible directions of research 
 
 
 We can determine several possible fields of the practical utilization of our results. One 
is the elaboration of political and security-policy decisions. The territorial political 
geographical researches represent an important starting point of the political and diplomatic 
resolutions. 
 
 Another field of utilization can be the elaboration of the economical decisions of 
companies wishing to invest and trade in the region. Similarly to the political and diplomatic 
decisions, the economical decisions do not lack the well grounded information as well as the 
possible reveal of the processes and characteristics of the concerned region.  
 
 A third field for utilization is more academic, namely the results of the research can 
serve as a basis for further researches and study-aid in higher education. 
 
 We may say that further directions of our studies are self-evident. We faced 
difficulties during our research, since we chose a topic which is not an “ended” one. Its course 
of proceedings is happening in front of our eyes, so on the one hand there is the danger that 
time and future developments might overwrite our conclusions, on the other hand pursuing 
the status of Kosovo, the changes of its social, economical, political and geopolitical state of 
affairs will provide ammunition for researchers dealing with this topic for a long time. 
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